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Abstract  
Concession Contracts (CC) and Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) have quite different implications 
for Government Take and the properties of the tax system, such as progressivity. In general, taxation 
via CC introduces significant distortions in activity, particularly due to the balance of royalties which 
tax production irrespective of the profitability of the project. So CC is normally regressive while PSC 
is normally progressive, because PSC taxation depends more directly on the profitability of the 
project. Chad has the distinction of having introduced PSC in the 2007 Chad oil code, while 
maintaining a royalty on production. Despite this feature, we show with a Cash Flow model and 
Monte Carlo simulations that the application of the 2007 oil code introduced more progressivity into 
taxation. This feature is particularly interesting in the current context of falling crude oil prices, 
because it maintains a favorable tax regime for exploration and exploitation by multinational oil 
companies. As a result, the Chad government should reactivate a counter-cyclical policy of oil revenue 
reserves when the crude oil price increases again. 
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Introduction  
Industries such as those in the oil extraction sector can generate considerable income. Applying a tax 
system that captures a big part of the rent while providing incentives for exploration and development 
of new oil fields by International Oil Companies (IOCs) is therefore the priority of oil producer 
Developing Countries. There is a specific tax system in the oil sector because of the sector’s special 
features, including massive investment and a necessarily complex technology controlled by IOCs 
(Petermann et al, 2007). The issue of rent sharing, and therefore the tax system, is a major challenge 
for Chad, whose economy is heavily dependent on oil. In 2013 oil accounted for over 70% of Chad’s 
tax revenues, 90% of total exports, and 30% of nominal GDP (IMF, Report No. 13/284). 
The discovery of oil in Chad goes back more than 40 years, but political tensions and major logistical 
barriers to the export of oil delayed the exploitation of crude until 2003. From 2000, the World Bank 
support accelerated the construction of a pipeline. At a cost of USD 4.2 billion, this pipeline then 
represented the biggest private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chad had proven reserves of crude 
of around 1.5 billion barrels at end 2013, which puts it in 10th place in Africa. After reaching a peak 
of 173,000 barrels per day in 2005, production steadily declined to 91,000 barrels per day in 2013.The 
inauguration of new fields in 2014 stopped the downward trend in oil production. These fields should 
stabilize the production level at around 88 million barrels in 2017 (IMF, Report No. 14/282). In the 
absence of new discoveries, production will decrease gradually and be completed by 2034. 
A few years after the beginning of oil extraction, a major disagreement occurred between the 
government and the IOC consortium
1
 about the oil revenue-sharing agreements. The 1988
2
Agreement 
covers the extraction of oil from three of the original Doba fields
3
. The Petroleum Code of 1962, 
which gives the outlines of the contractual relationship between Chad and the IOCs, is based on CC. 
The two main tax instruments are royalties and corporate tax. 
The low Government Take
4
 is due to the taxation arrangements which were designed to attract IOCs 
because of the low quality of Chad crude oil, high transport costs (no coastline, construction of a 
pipeline), and generally high operating risks (Leenhardt, 2005). The government’s inexperience in 
negotiations with the IOCs is another reason which explains that this share was deemed unfair by the 
government (Margonelli, 2007). 
                                                     
1
Initially Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and Petronas. 
2
The first version of this agreement of the CC kind was signed on December 19
th 
1988. This version was 
amended on May 19
th
 1993, March 12
th 
1997 and finally October 16
th
 1999. 
3
Komé, Miandoum and Bolobo. 
4
The Government Take for a given field, a concession or a basin is the ratio of the sum of the undiscounted net 
cash flow accruing to the State over the entire commercial life of the deposit based on the total net Cash flow 
generated by oil operations (including related research investment deposit, concession or basin). (Leenhardt B., 
2005). 
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In 2004 the government tried to renegotiate the tax system of the 1998 Agreement. Despite the 1.6 
million USD in legal aid provided by the World Bank, the renegotiation has not resolved the 
disagreement on Government Take, because of a non-retroactivity clause which locks the key 
provisions of the 1988 Agreement (Gary and Reisch, 2004).This disagreement crystallized following 
the rise in crude oil prices since 2004, which allowed a rapid return on investment
5
.  To modify the 
terms of sharing of oil revenues, the new 2007 oil code substitutes the Production Sharing Contract 
(PSC) for the CC. 
There is no "standard" CC or PSC. These are different instruments and methods of taxation that impact 
differently in the way they approach oil revenue sharing. Both types of contract can therefore, in 
principle, enable the Government to achieve its objectives of oil revenue sharing. Given the 
importance of oil to the Chad economy and the need for further exploration activities and field 
development, despite the unfavorable economic climate and the fall in oil prices, this paper compares 
the two kind of contracts used in Chad mainly through Government Take and the incentive nature of 
the tax design. The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. The first section presents the oil tax 
design and its evolution. The second part presents the literature and describes the methodology and 
data used in our model. The third gives the results and analyzes the changes between the two 
agreements. 
The tax regime design for the upstream oil sector in Chad: Concession Contract versus 
Production Sharing Contract 
Chad's oil tax regime is defined by its 2007 oil code (Act No. 006/PR/2007 of 2 February 2007), 
supplemented by Decree No. 796/PR/PM/MPE/2010 which lays down detailed rules, and Ordinance 
No. 001/PR/2010 approving the PSC. If these texts constitute the institutional framework for reference 
in legal and tax matters for the sector, the CC signed before 2007, under the Ordinance 
No.007/PC/TP/MH February 3
rd
 1962, remains in effect. These are primarily the agreements signed in 
December 1998 and May 2004 concerning the operation of the Doba field, the agreement signed in 
February 1999 confirmed  in 2012 by the CNPCIC, and the agreement signed in January 2006 
confirmed  in 2012 by OPIC Africa (Taiwanese national oil company). 
Concession Contract Agreements 
For the operations of the Doba basin, three legal documents bind the IOC Consortium, Chad, and 
Cameroon. Firstly the establishment of the   two agreements for the operating companies for; a. the 
Cameroon side Chad pipeline downstream, and b. "research convention, exploitation and 
transportation of hydrocarbons” upstream, both dating from 1988 and which were subject to later 
                                                     
5
According to the 2012 Exxon Mobil Annual Report, the rise in crude prices starting in 2004 allowed a rapid 
return on investments, and early payment of Corporate Tax in 2006 (Project Update No. 33). 
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revision (amendment No. 2, March 1997),   these two documents set out the modalities for the 
management of the pipeline (royalties, taxation and law, litigation between the parties, etc.). The third 
between Chad and the Consortium only, establishes the taxes levied on operations. 
The Convention of 1988, supplemented by the 2004 agreement, based on the 1962 oil code enshrines 
the concession system as the sharing mode for oil revenues. The tax provisions of the Code concern 
mainly the application of a royalty and a net profit tax (corporate tax). The royalty rate is fixed in the 
1962 code at 12.5%. It was increased in 2004 to 14.25% at the signing of the agreement governing the 
new fields of Timbré and Maikeri. The net profit tax rate depends on the field. Apart from the Nya and 
Moundouli fields to which is applied a single rate of 50%, the other fields are subject to a rate that 
varies with the price of crude and an R factor, calculated as the ratio between revenue accumulated net 
after-tax upstream of the investor and the investors’ cumulative upstream investment costs. 
Table 1: Rate of Petroleum net profit tax 
Crude Oil Reference Price US$1995/barrel R ratio<1.75 1.75<R≤2.50 R≥2.50 
≤18$ 40% 50% 65% 
>18$ et ≤ 19$ 45% 52,5% 65% 
>19$ et ≤ 20$ 50% 55% 65% 
>20$ et ≤ 21$ 55% 57,5% 65% 
>21$ et ≤ 22$ 55% 57,5% 65% 
> 22.00$ 60% 60% 65% 
Source: Convention of 1988 for three originals fields (Komé, Miandoum and Bolobo) 
These agreements allow for several exemptions - the contractual minimum tax (IMF), patent fees, land 
tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), duties and taxes on petroleum products, vehicle taxes, levies on 
dividend distributions, and technical assistance. Lastly, the 1988 Convention contains a stability clause 
(Article 34) which “fixes” the terms of sharing of oil revenues. 
Production Sharing Contract Agreements 
The 2007 oil code and the application laws that followed were initiated to increase the share of oil 
revenues collected by the Government. The 2007 oil code maintains a royalty on production at rates 
ranging from 14.25 to 16.5% and introduces a public capital stake of the Societé des Hydrocarbures du 
Tchad (SHT)
6
 in the capital of the private operator, which may not exceed 20%. The maximum public 
capital stake was set in 2014 at 25% in future farm projects following the renegotiation of exploration 
contracts with the China National Petroleum Corporation International (CNPCIC). This state 
participation is made in return for payment without interest in proportion to the costs of the search and 
development operations of oil fields (Paragraphs 4a and 4b of the Petroleum Code’s Article 14). 
                                                     
6
 A public company representing the interests of the Government. 
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The production sharing contract between SHT and the private operator shares net crude oil production 
that is the crude oil production less the amount of crude oil which covers production costs (cost oil). 
The code states that these costs cannot exceed 70% of crude oil production minus the royalties levied 
on all contractual areas. The remainder of the crude oil production, the profit oil, is split between the 
private operator and the SHT according to an R factor (Table 2). The numerator is the amount of sales 
accumulated since the beginning of the operation until the last quarter before the quarter for the sale, 
less accumulated operating costs (operational costs and investments) in the same period. The 
denominator is the sum of the accumulated costs of development operations and costs of exploratory 
activities conducted. 
 
Table 2: Profit Oil distribution scheme  
R  Factor <2.25 2.25<R<3 >3 
IOC's share in the Profit Oil 60% 50% 40% 
OPC’s share in the Profit Oil  40% 50% 60% 
Source: PSC between Chad and PETROCHAD MANGARA. 
A statistical royalty is also levied on the value of oil exports. Its tax base is the value of exported crude 
oil, which is slightly different from the production of crude oil due to the existence of an amount taken 
from the pipeline to operate the pumping centers. The statistical royalty rate is 1% for the 1998 
agreement, and 1.5% for the 2004 agreement. The 2007 oil code introduced two types of bonuses. The 
Signature Bonuses whose amount is not fixed, and Attribution Bonuses for an exclusive operating 
license whose amount is set at $ 2 million. These two types of bonuses are considered as an 
unrecoverable oil cost. 
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Table 3: List of oil exploitation in Chad and nature of contract  
companies in production  
 Operator  Bloc  Partner  Nature of contract  Date of  signature  International Oil 
Companies 
1 Esso E&P CHAD (40%) Chari Bolobo 
Chari Komé 
Chari Maikeri 
Chari Timbré 
Chari Moundouli 
Chari Miandoum 
Chari Nya 
Petronas Caligari  (35%) and  
Chevron Petroleum Chad (25%) 
Concession  Contract  December 1988 and  June 
2004 
EXXONMOBIL 
 (United States) 
2 CNPCI (100%) H (Rônier) 
H (Mimosa) 
H (Madiago) 
 Concession  Contract February 1999 CNPC (China) 
3 GLENCORE ENERGY (75%) DOB 
DOI 
SHT (25%) Production Sharing Contract   Glencore-Xstrata 
(Switzerland)  
Companies in exploration   
1 CNPCIC (100%) H (Bongor Est) 
H (BongorOuest) 
H (Chari Ouest) 
H (Lac Tchad) 
H (Madiago Est) 
H (MadiagoOuest) 
H (Sédigui) 
 Concession  Contract February 1999 CNPC (China) 
2 OPIC (70%) Chari Ouest III (50%) 
Chari Sud II 
Lac Tchad I 
SHT (30%) Concession  Contract January  2006 CPC (Taiwan) 
3 ERHC ENERGY (100%) 
ERHC ENERGY (100%) 
ERHC ENERGY (100%) 
BDS-2008 
Chari Ouest III (50%) 
Manga 
 Production Sharing Contract  ERHC Energy Inc.  
(United States) 
4 GLOBAL PETROLEUM (100%) Djado III 
DOE 
DOF 
DOG 
Largeau V 
 Production Sharing Contract  Nigeria 
 
5 GLENCORE ENERGY (100%) 
GLENCORE ENERGY(100%) 
GLENCORE ENERGY(100%) 
Borogop 
Chari Est Doséo 
DOH 
 Production Sharing Contract  Glencore-Xstrata 
(Switzerland) 
7 PETRA BV (100%) Erdis  Production Sharing Contract  PETRA ENERGIA, 
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PETRA BV (100%) 
PETRA BV (75%) 
PETRA BV (75%) 
PETRA BV (75%) 
PETRA BV (75%) 
PETRA BV (100%) 
Erdis 2008 
Erdis V 
Lac Tchad 
MD-2008 
Siltou I 
Siltou II 
 
SHT (25%) 
SHT (25%) 
SHT (25%) 
SHT (25%) 
 
STR GROUP (Brazil) 
 
8 SAS PETROLEUM (75%) Erdis IV SHT (25%) 
 
Production Sharing Contract   
9 SIMBA ENERGY (100%) Chari Sud I 
Chari Sud II (50%) 
Erdis III 
 Production Sharing Contract  SIMBA ENERGY 
(Canada) 
10 TCA ENERGY (GTI) (75%) DOA 
Largeau IV 
WD2-2008 
SHT (25%) Production Sharing Contract  GTI SA 
Nigeria 
 
11 UNITED HYDROCARBON (75%) 
UNITED HYDROCARBON (75%) 
UNITED HYDROCARBON (75%) 
UNITED HYDROCARBON (100%) 
DOC 
DOD 
Lac Tchadwithout Sédigui 
Largeau III 
SHT (25%) 
SHT (25%) 
SHT (25%) 
Production Sharing Contract  UNITED 
HYDROCARBON 
INTERNATIONAL 
CORP. 
(Canada) 
12 VIKING EXPLORATION (100%) DOC 
DOD 
Erdis 
Siltou I 
Siltou II 
 Production Sharing Contract 7   
13 OIL TREK (100%) DOC 
DOD 
 Production Sharing Contract 8   
Carriage  of hydrocarbons (pipeline) 
1 TOTCO      
2 COTCO      
DOWNSTREAM ( OIL REFINERY) 
1 CNPCIC (60%)  Rônier and Mimosa  SHT (40%)  July 2011 CNPC (China) 
Source: ETIE-Chad, 2012 Report, Fair Links. Update for the years 2013 and 2014. 
                                                     
7
 Contract cancelled in March (ETIE-Chad, 2012 Report, Fair Links.) 
8
 Contract cancelled in October 2011 (ETIE-Chad, 2012 Report, Fair Links.) 
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Methodology and data  
The evaluation of tax design for natural resources has been the subject of an abundant literature both 
theoretically and empirically. Smith (2012) provides a broad review of work highlighting the wide 
variety of methods and models. Blake and Roberts (2006), following Lund (1992), use the approach 
known as "contingent claim analysis"
9
 to compare 5 tax systems
10
. In a context of uncertainty about 
prices and using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, they classify these tax regimes according to the 
economic distortions they cause. Lund (1992), in an application to the Norway tax regime shows that 
the application of concession contracts lead to significant distortions for the Norwegian economy. 
Many authors use more empirical methods based on the development of scenarios. A basic scenario 
defines the volume of reserves, the scope and the investment period, the number of wells, the drilling 
rate success, the intensity of development, the initial production rate (or decline), the variable 
operating costs, etc. Based on assumptions about oil prices and the main taxes, it is then possible to 
calculate the cash flow and the Government Take over the project lifetime, for different scenarios. 
The Peaceman model (1977) is based on the simulation of the crude extraction rate of gas and water 
from a reservoir. Reservoir characteristics are obtained by exploiting the geophysical modeling and 
three-dimensional geology to capture heterogeneous reservoir features. By simulating the physical and 
financial consequences of an alternative drilling program, this approach allows for optimization of the 
value of the resource. The investor's behavior can be studied after the introduction of a tax which 
would change the structure of net cash flows, regardless of the anticipated development plan of the 
field. Uhler (1979) built an integrated model of the exploration and extraction process which, when 
applied in its simplest form to a homogeneous reservoir leads directly to a model of exponential 
decline in which the rate of production of each field decreases in a constant rate each period. This 
approach also takes into account the pressure injection operations that can slow the rate of decline and 
increase the volume of recoverable reserves. Jacoby and Smith (1985), Helmioskoui and others 
(1992), and Rao (2000) have refined the model by incorporating other variables such as the 
heterogeneity of reservoirs and pressure. 
 There is a wide variety of papers on how taxation affects different aspects of the development of oil 
projects. These papers include a variety of methods to analyze the behavior of IOCs. Like Poterba 
(2010), Smith (2012
11
) considered the ideal approach would be to model a comprehensive tax system 
                                                     
9
This approach allows consideration of the cash flows as a nonlinear function of the value of the underlying 
asset. 
 
10
 These regimes include those of the Province of Alberta in Canada which consists of a Corporate Income Tax 
and a Royalty; the pre-2003 regime of Papua New Guinea (PNG) based on the traditional Rate of Return (RR); 
the joint project of Sao Tome and Principe & Nigeria based on a PSC (SNDJZ); the Tanzanian hybrid system 
based on RR /PSC; and the PSC regime of Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
11
Smith (2012) cites Kemp (1987, 1992, 1994); Van Meurs (1988, 2012); Smith (1995b, 1997); Schiozer and 
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based on a robust production model of an extractive industry. Smith (2012) proposes a modeling 
technique which specifically permits the analysis of how IOCs would adjust the intensity of 
exploratory activities, the timing and intensity of the initial development of the fields, the timing and 
intensity of enhanced recovery, and the eventual abandonment of fields in unfavorable conditions due 
to lower prices. This is a simple exploration and development model for studying the performance of 
an alternative tax system, and to identify potential distortions. The performance of a natural resource 
tax system depends on (i) its ability to increase government revenues; (ii) potential distortions that 
reduce the value of the after tax cash flows; (iii) the allocation of risk between the Government and the 
IOC. 
To compare the two different agreements in Chad, we use a cash-flow model applied to real data from 
the Doba project, covering its technical features and cost structure. The analysis focuses on the 
Government Take, the progressivity in taxation, and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the private 
operators of the two oil agreements, after making a series of assumptions about changes in oil prices 
and the rate of extraction (Monte Carlo simulations). 
Production Profile 
During the initial extraction, the extraction rate is determined by natural forces in the reservoir 
(pressure, permeability of reservoir rocks, viscosity of crude trapped, etc.) (Smith, 2012). Production 
(Qt) then decreases from the initial production level (Q0) at a fixed rate (a) during that initial 
production phase: 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄0𝑒
−𝑎𝑡   𝑡 ≥ 0                                 (1) 
 
The production falls due to the drop in pressure in the reservoir as the volume of crude decreases 
(Uhler, 1979). The depletion rate, and therefore the rate of decline, is determined by the intensity of 
the operator's development effort (number of wells drilled in the reservoir, drilling platforms, and 
water injectors). 
The volume of primary reserves (R) is given by the following formula: 
𝑅 = ∫ 𝑄𝑡
∞
0
𝑑𝑡 =
𝑄0
𝑎
                                 (2) 
According to the equation (2), 𝑄0 = 𝑎 × 𝑅 .The rate of decline (a) and the extraction rate are identical. 
It follows from this equation that the volume of the remaining reserves in the reservoir (Rt) at time t is 
given by: 
𝑅𝑡 =
𝑄𝑡
𝑎
= 𝑅𝑒−𝑎𝑡                                      (3) 
 
The first year of production is given by the formula: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Suslick (2003); Johnston (2003); Tordo (2007); Johnston, Johnston and Rogers (2008); and Daniel et al (2010). 
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q1=a×R,                                                    (4) 
and production for the following years by the formula: 
qt+1= (1-a)×qt.                                                                (5) 
The cash-flow model  
The Net Present Value (NPV) of the project before government tax can be calculated from the 
following formula: 
NPV = ∑
𝑍𝑡−𝐶𝑡−𝐾𝑡
(1+𝑖∗)𝑛
𝑇
𝑡=0                               (6) 
𝑍𝑡 is the expected turnover from the sale of crude oil, Ct the unit operational cost expressed in $/b, Kt 
the capital cost for the initial development of operations and the maintenance of production. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is used to assess the profitability of the project. The OIC compares it 
to the minimum threshold expected to develop the business (Macey 1998). In this sector, OICs 
develop the fields only if feasibility studies show an IRR greater than or equal to 100% at the latest 
during the seventh year of production. That is explained by the fact this big return on investment is 
needed to minimize project risks. It is therefore a decision tool for investment. The before tax IRR of a 
project is obtained from the following equation: 
NPV = 0 = ∑
𝑍𝑡−𝐶𝑡−𝐾𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑛
𝑇
𝑡=0  (7) 
It corresponds to the yield or compound interest rate that cancels the NPV. 
To estimate the tax rent generated during all the life of a project, we used the Average Effective Tax 
Rate (AETR) which is the ratio of the sum of all the parts of the rent collected under the various 
provisions of taxation and the before NPV of the project. It is given by:  
𝐴𝐸𝑇𝑅 =
∑ 𝐹𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
∑ 𝑍𝑡−𝐶𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 −𝐾𝑡
 (8) 
Ft represents the sum of government tax levies. 
Oil price projection and Monte Carlo simulation  
The forecasting of future crude prices is an important step in the evaluation of oil tax regimes in a 
context of uncertainty. The high volatility of crude prices does not permit to detect a long-term 
relationship describing the evolution of the price. 
That why in this paper, the Brent oil price which constitutes the reference for the Doba oil project is 
forecasted on the basis of a Geometric Brownian Model (GBM). Lund (1992), and Blake and Roberts 
(2006) used the same approach since its projections have the advantage of being more realistic than 
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the Auto Regressive models (AR). Our model is derived from the model developed by Hull (2000) 
whose functional form is: 
𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑃(0)exp{[𝑟 − 𝛼 − (
µ2
2
)] 𝑇 + µ𝛽√𝑇}(9) 
Where T represents time at the end of each tax cycle, P (T) and P (0) the price of Brent at the period T 
and 0,  𝛼 the net marginal convenience yield from storage (convenience yield less marginal storage 
costs), and r the nominal risk free interest rate. 
The standard deviation (µ) and the average annual price of Brent (β) over the 1977 to 2013 period are 
29.9% and $ 39.75 per barrel respectively. The nominal rate of interest without risk is approximated as 
in Blake and Roberts (2006) by the rate of return of United States bonds for the 30 years 
corresponding to the life of the project. The data used to generate the price projections are shown in 
the table below. 
Table 4: Parameters used in GBM model  
Parameters Values  
µ 29.9% 
β $ 39.75 
P(0) 50 
α 4% 
r 4.75% 
Given the extreme volatility of crude oil prices, including the sudden climb from 2005 when prices 
rose from $ 54 to more than $ 111 per barrel in 2012, our simulations are based on 5 price scenarios 
with 10,000 simulations per scenario. This Monte Carlo approach takes into account the uncertainty of 
the variables that influence the project profitability by using probability distributions. 
Chart 1: Changes in Brent oil price ($/barrel) 
 
Source: British Petroleum. 
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Data and sources 
Our model uses economic data for the main field in the Doba basin, called Komé, whose proven 
reserves were estimated at 588 million barrels. This basin has 6 other fields, the most important in 
terms of reserves are Miandoum and Bolobo, with respectively 227 and 135 million barrels of oil. The 
588 million barrels of the principal field, Komé, are spread over two reservoirs, one with 560 million 
barrels in the geological layer of the Upper Cretaceous, and one with 28 million barrels in the Lower 
Cretaceous. The recovery factor was set at a maximum of 40%. Estimates of operating costs are based 
on data observed in the Doba project. The main features of this field and the model are detailed in Box 
1. 
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Box 1: Basic parameters of the oil fields and tax systems used in the model  
 Proven reserves (Millions (Millions of  Barrels) : 588 
 Rate of extraction (%) : 7.2 
 Development investment level of the field (USD MM) : 942.4212 
 Exploratory cost ($ MM) : 435.5 
 Unit Operating Cost per barrel, OPEX ($/b) : 5 13 
 Unit Capital Cost, CAPEX ($/b) : 1114 
 Discount rate r (%) : 8 
 Base case Brent price per barrel ($) : 50 
 Discount of Doba crude oil (%) : 10 
 Transportation Cost per barrel ($/b) : 10 
Two kinds of tax regimes are analyzed in the model : 
The PSC applied in the Doba Project includes the following tax terms : 
 Production Royalty (RP) with a rate of 12.5% 
 Corporate Tax (CT) with a rate between 40 and 65% and according to the Brent oil price.  
The Production Sharing Contract is based on the agreement concluded in 2011 for the exploitation of 
Badilla and Mangara fields located in the Dosseo basin. It involves the following tax terms :  
 Cost Oil must not exceed 70%   
 Profit Oil is shared between the OIC and the government through the national oil company SHT. 
The share is done according to a share rate depending on the R factor. The sharing of Profit Oil 
between the two partners is done as follows: 
o If  R< 2.25 then the government share of Profit Oil is 40% 
o If 2.25<R<  then the government share of Profit Oil is 50% 
o IF R>3  then the government share of the  Profit Oil is 60% 
 Public participation in the capital of the consortium is 25% 
We ignored the signature bonuses, statistical royalty and surface fees, taxes on wages, and license fees for 
which revenues can be considered as negligible. 
 
Results and analysis 
 
The sharing of oil revenues can only be considered if the tax system has enough incentive for investors 
to engage in the search for oil fields and in their operation. The tax system of the various contracts is 
evaluated in three dimensions: the share of oil revenues collected by the government, the government 
revenue, and the incentive nature of the tax system through the rate of IRR for the investor and the 
progressivity in taxation. 
                                                     
12
 It corresponds to the total development expenditure weighted by the size of the project field reserves. The 
same treatment is used for exploratory investments. 
 
13
 The unit operating cost is an average unit cost over the period 2003-2008. 
 
14
This is an average over the period 2003-2008. It is relatively high according to the consortium, due to an 
increased presence of water in reservoirs requiring the drilling of new wells to maintain the production level. 
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The analysis of the results initially covers the basic scenario in which a Brent price of 50 USD per 
barrel is used, followed by a sensitivity analysis with three other price scenarios. Based on 10,000 
simulations, the average NPV of the project is USD 5.9 billion, and the average IRR before tax is 
105.5% for the base case. 
Analysis of tax regimes under the base case scenario 
The Average Effective Tax Rate (AETR), which represents the share of oil revenues collected by the 
government, is relatively higher for the CC (74.5%) than for the PSC (70.5%). The government 
revenues are lower under the PSC than the CC. The After-tax IRR is lower under the CC (24.1%) than 
the PSC (40.4%) (Table 5). 
Table 5: Economic results in the base case  
 AETR 
(%) 
IOC share of 
oil revenues 
(%) 
After-tax IRR 
(%) 
Government 
revenues  ($ 
MM) 
IOC revenues 
(($ MM) 
Concession Contract  74.5% 25.5% 24.1% 4,605.4 1,304.4 
Production Sharing Contract  70.% 29.5% 40.4% 4,186.7 1,723.1 
 
Analysis of other price scenarios 
By taking into consideration various price scenarios, we can assess the progressivity of the two tax 
systems. The AETR of the CC decreases as the price rises.  The AETR of the PSC rises as the price 
rises. When the oil price increases from $ 50 to $ 110, the AETR decreases from 74.5% to 66.9% with 
CC, whereas it rises from 70.5 to 74.7% with the PSC. The state’s revenues are greater for the PSC 
than the CC, except for low oil prices (Table 6). 
Table 6: Economic performance under the other price scenarios  
Price Scenario  Oil price : $/b 110  Oil price  : $/b 90 Oil price  : $/b 70 Oil price  : $/b 50 
Before tax IRR (%) 525% 358% 220% 105% 
NPV (Million USD) 22,868.0 17,215.3 11,547.6 5,909.8 
AETR CC (%) 66.9% 67.7% 69.3% 74.5% 
Share of the IOCCC (%) 33% 32% 31% 25% 
After tax IRR (%) 159% 107% 63% 24% 
Government revenues CC (Million USD) 15,497.5 11,860.6 8,215.8 4,605.4 
IOC revenues CC (Million USD) 7,370.4 5,354.7 3,331.8 1,304.4 
AETRCPP (%)  74.7% 74.5% 73.9% 70.5% 
IOC share of the PSC (%) 25% 25% 26% 29% 
Before tax IRR (%) PSC (%)  168% 129% 88% 40% 
Government revenues PSC (Million USD)  17,032.0 12,769.3 8,451.3 4,186.7 
IOC revenues PSC (Million USD) 5,836.0 4,445.9 3,096.3 1,723.1 
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The tax system based on the CC is regressive while that based on the PSC is progressive (Chart 3). 
The AETR of the CC curve clearly decreases whereas that for CPP increases slightly before 
stabilizing. 
Chart 2  : Evolution of the progressivity of the two tax regimes  
 
 
The After-tax IRR of the PSC is always higher than that of the CC, although the two curves converge 
at high oil prices (Chart 4). The two contracts are equivalent for the investor at high prices but diverge 
significantly at low prices. 
100 simulations at each dollar level of price between $ 57 and $ 61 per barrel were conducted to 
determine the price at which government revenues and the AETR of the PSC become higher than 
those of the CC. For this price level, government revenues are around 5.8 billion of $ for an after-tax 
IRR of 36.4%. 
Table 7: Approximation of barrel price at which the METR (CPP) becomes higher than the METR (CC) 
Crude oil price  ($/b) AETR CC (%) AETR CPP (%) Gap between CC and CPP (%) 
56 72.2% 70.9% +1.32% 
57 71.7% 71.6% +0.14% 
58 71.4% 71.8% -0.37% 
59 71.1% 72.1% -1.00% 
60 70.9% 72.3% -1.47% 
61 70.6% 72.6% -1.99% 
62 70.5% 72.9% -2.39% 
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Chart 3: Evolution of the after tax project profitability 
 
 
 
The gap between the before, and after IRR increases sharply when the Brent price increases. In 
absolute terms, the government revenue increases sharply with the increase in the price of Brent, but in 
a smaller proportion with the PSC than with the CC. 
 
Chart 4: Evolution of before tax IRR and after tax IRR 
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Conclusions 
There is no real "standard” CC and PSC. Each country defines the tools and methods of taxation it 
intends to apply through these contracts. The instruments and modalities of the contracts determine the 
properties of the tax system. In general, taxation instruments accompanying concession contracts 
introduce significant distortions in activity, particularly due to the effect of royalties as a taxation 
instrument, because royalties tax production activity irrespective of the profitability of the project. So 
CC taxation is often regressive. The "pure" PSC is normally progressive because oil revenues are 
mainly based on profits tax, often with a rate which varies depending on the profitability of the 
project. 
Chad has the specificity of having introduced into its legislation the PSC while maintaining royalties. 
Although deductible on profit, this royalty is contrary to the expected progressivity of a tax system 
based on a PSC. Despite this feature, the application of Chad oil code 2007 allows the government to 
capture a larger share of oil revenues, compared to the 1988 agreement, but also a gradually increasing 
share as the profitability of the oil field improves. This feature is particularly interesting in the current 
context of falling crude oil prices, because it balances risks between State and Consortium, and 
maintains a favorable tax regime for exploration and exploitation by IOCs. As a result, the Chadian 
government should reactivate a counter-cyclical policy of oil revenue reserves when the crude oil price 
increases again. 
. 
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Appendix 1: Mathematical formulae of the tax provisions used in the model  
 
OPEXt=oQt  
CAPEXt=cQt  
PBt=(1-D)Pt 
Concession  Contract 
1. BTCF𝑡 = 𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 −    𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 −  𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 
Where 
2. TAX𝑡 = 𝑅𝑃𝑡 +  𝐼𝑆𝑡 
3. PR𝑡 = 𝑟1(𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 ) 
4. CT𝑡 = 𝑟2(𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 −  PR𝑡  − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 − 𝐷𝐴𝑀𝑡) 
Production Sharing Contract  
5. PR𝑡 = 𝑟3(𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 ) 
6. CS𝑡 = 70%(𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 − PR𝑡) 
7. CO𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 +  𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 𝑖𝑓 CO𝑡 < CS𝑡 ;  
Otherwise 70%(𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 − PR𝑡) for the first period  
8. CO𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 +  𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 + (CO𝑡−1 − CS𝑡−1)  𝑖𝑓  CO𝑡 < CS𝑡 ;  
Otherwise 70% (𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 − PR𝑡) for the other periods 
 
9. R =
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 +  𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 + 𝑃𝐵𝑡𝑄𝑡 
𝑛
𝑡=0
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
 
10. If (
𝑅 < 2.25
0
⇒ 𝑟4 = 40%
2.25 < 𝑅 < 3
0
⇒ 𝑟4 = 50%
𝑅 > 3 
0
⇒ 𝑟4 = 60%
)
0
 
 
11. PO𝑡 =  𝐶𝐴𝑡 − RP𝑡 − CO𝑡 
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12. POE𝑡 =  𝑟4 PO𝑡 
13. PE𝑡 = 𝑟5(PO𝑡0 − POE𝑡) 
14. POC𝑡 = PO𝑡 − POE𝑡 −  PE𝑡 
Appendix 2: Glossary of terms used in the equations  
o : The unit operating per barrel  
c : The unit capital cost per barrel  
D : Discount of Doba crude oil  
r1 : Production royalty in the CC (12.5%). 
r2 : Corporate Tax (CT)   rate at period t ( 60%). 
r3 : Production royalty in the 2014  CC and PSC  (14.25%). 
r4 : The profit oil sharing rate based on the R factor at period t. 
r5 : The State's participation rate in the consortium set at 25%. 
Pt : Brent annual average price which is the reference for oil from the Doba fields 
BFCFt : Before-tax  Cash-Flows at period t 
Tt : Turnover in period t which corresponds to  the annual oil production (Qt) multiplied by the oil 
price of Doba Blend (PBt). 
CAPEXt : Total of Capital Cost paid in period t. 
OPEXt : Total of Operating Cost paid in period t. 
RPt : Production Royalty paid in period t. 
DAMt : Depreciation in period t. 
CTt : Corporate Tax paid in period t. 
TAXt : total of taxes paid in period t. 
COt : Cost Oil paid in period t. 
CSt : Cost Stop paid  in period t.  
POt : Profit Oil realized in period t. 
POEt : State share of Profit Oil in period t. 
POCt : IOC share of Profit Oil in period t. 
PEt : Dividends from the share capital of the state in the consortium in period t. 
Rt : R factor in period t. 
 
Études et Documents n° 25, CERDI, 2015 
 
 
iii 
 
Appendix 3: Comparisons between the tax provisions of CC and PSC 
Nature of contract  Concession Contract  Production Sharing Contract  
Laws Ordinance No. 07/PC/TP/MH of 3 
February 1962 
Law No. 006 /PR / of 2 May 2007 
Decree No. 796/PR/PM/MPE/2010 
Ordinance No. 001/PR/2010 
 Production royalty  Fixed rate of 12.5%  Variable rate between 14.25%  and 16.5% 
 
Corporate tax  Range between 40 and 65% and 
according to two parameters: 
 The price of benchmark Brent 
 The R Factor rate 
Range between 40% and 60% and according 
to the R factor 
Surface area (??)Tax  100$/km
2
 200$/km
2
 
State participation No state participation State participation up to 25%  
Exemptions  Value Added Tax (VAT)  
 Duties and taxes on petroleum 
products 
 Vehicle taxes 
 Levies on dividends and 
technical assistance 
 Total exemption for all imports 
of the Project. 
Idem  
Others fiscal terms Presence of the Stability Agreement 
clause 
Stop Cost cannot exceed 70%  
 
 
Appendix 4:  Fiscal positions for the 7 fields in the Doba Basin  
 1998 Agreement 2004 Agreement 
Field  Komé, Miandoum, 
Bolobo 
Nya and 
Moundouli 
Maikeri and  Timbré 
Production royalty 12.50% 14.25% 
Statistic Royalty  1.0% 1.5% 
Corporate Tax 40%-65% 50% 50%-65% 
Sources : 1998 and 2004 Agreements. 
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Appendix 5: Production profile of the three original fields  
 
Source : Chad export Project, 1999, Chapter 2.0 reservoir management, «Project description Supporting 
document.
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Appendix 6: Statistical Simulations 
Oil price of  
110 $/b 
Before Tax 
IRR (%) 
Before 
Tax NPV 
($ MM) 
AETR   
CC 
IOC share 
of rent CC 
(%) 
Before tax 
IRR CC 
Government 
revenues  
CC ($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
CC ($ MM) 
AETR 
PSC 
Consortium 
sharing 
PSC (%) 
After tax IRR 
PSC 
Government 
revenues  
PSC 
($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
PSC ($ MM) 
Average 525.3%  22,868.0  66.9% 33.1% 159.5%  15,497.5   7,370.4  74.7% 25.3% 167.7%  17,032.0   5,836.0  
Standard 
deviation  
78.7%  1,611.5  0.1% 0.1% 21.3%  1,047.4   564.5  0.1% 0.1% 15.4%  1,206.9   408.4  
CV
15
 15.0%  0.1  0.2% 0.4% 13.4%  0.1   0.1  0.2% 0.5% 9.2%  0.1   0.1  
Maximum 740.8%  29,295.1  67.6% 33.5% 226.0%  19,675.7   9,619.4  75.0% 25.9% 218.2%  21,797.5   7,497.6  
Minimum 363.4%  17,525.9  66.5% 32.4% 109.9%  12,034.3   5,491.7  74.1% 25.0% 131.5%  12,919.3   4,542.8  
 
Oil price of  
90 $ /b 
Before Tax 
IRR (%) 
Before 
Tax NPV 
($ MM) 
AETR   
CC 
IOC share 
of rent CC 
(%) 
Before tax 
IRR CC 
Government 
revenues  
CC ($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
CC ($ MM) 
AETR 
PSC 
Consortium 
sharing 
PSC (%) 
After tax IRR 
PSC 
Government 
revenues  
PSC 
($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
PSC ($ MM) 
Average 357.5%  17,215.3  67.7% 32.3% 107.1%  11,860.6   5,354.7  74.5% 25.5% 128.9%  12,769.3   4,445.9  
Standard 
deviation  
53.4%  1,300.2  0.2% 0.2% 14.5%  844.8   455.7  0.3% 0.3% 13.1%  985.4   323.8  
CV 14.9%  0.1  0.3% 0.6% 13.5%  0.1   0.1  0.3% 1.0% 10.2%  0.1   0.1  
Maximum  499.2%  22,189.5  68.7% 32.9% 151.2%  15,097.6   7,091.8  75.2% 26.3% 164.8%  16,593.4   5,596.1  
Minimum 242.1%  12,650.8  67.1% 31.3% 70.9%  8,896.4   3,754.4  73.7% 24.8% 95.5%  9,304.0   3,346.8  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15
 
Coefficient of variation. It corresponds to the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean 
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Oil price of  
70 $ /b 
Before Tax 
IRR (%) 
Before 
Tax NPV 
($ MM) 
AETR   
CC 
IOC share 
of rent CC 
(%) 
Before tax IRR 
CC 
Government 
revenues  
CC ($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
CC ($ MM) 
AETR 
PSC 
Consortium 
sharing 
PSC (%) 
After tax IRR 
PSC 
Government 
revenues  
PSC 
($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
PSC ($ MM) 
Average 220.0%  11,547.6  69.3% 30.7% 62.5%  8,215.8   3,331.8  73.9% 26.1% 87.7%  8,451.3   3,096.3  
Standard 
deviation  
34.4%  1,025.7  0.4% 0.4% 9.2%  666.5   359.4  0.5% 0.5% 11.4%  798.9   235.3  
CV 15.6%  0.1  0.6% 1.3% 14.7%  0.1   0.1  0.7% 1.9% 13.0%  0.1   0.1  
Maximum 313.3%  15,615.8  71.3% 31.8% 92.7%  10,875.1   4,740.7  75.8% 29.6% 118.5%  11,618.7   4 080,4  
Minimum 141.4%  7,821.0  68.2% 28.7% 38.3%  5,785.1   2,035.9  70.4% 24.2% 58.0%  5,471.9   2,349.1  
 
 
Oil price of  
50 $ /b 
Before Tax 
IRR (%) 
Before Tax 
NPV ($ 
MM) 
AETR   
CC 
IOC share 
of rent CC 
(%) 
Before tax 
IRR CC 
Government 
revenues  
CC ($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
CC ($ MM) 
AETR 
PSC 
Consortium 
sharing 
PSC (%) 
After tax IRR 
PSC 
Government 
revenues  
PSC 
($ MM) 
IOC revenues 
PSC ($ MM) 
Average 105.5%  5,909.8  74.5% 25.5% 24.1%  4,605.4   1,304.4  70.5% 29.5% 40.4%  4,186.7   1,723.1  
Standard 
deviation  
19,2%  728,7  1,4% 1,4% 5,2%  472,8   256,4  1,0% 1,0% 8,6%  506,3   225,4  
CV 18.2%  0.1  1.8% 5.4% 21.6%  0.1   0.2  1.4% 3.4% 21.2%  0.1   0.1  
Maximum  164.1%  8,584.0  84.2% 28.7% 45.4%  6,338.2   2,246.0  77.6% 32.2% 68.7%  6,183.0   2,446.8  
Minimum 58.5%  3,178.0  71.3% 15.8% 6.9%  2,856.6   321.3  67.8% 22.4% 16.7%  2,483.4   694.6  
 
